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In 1921, a theatre play “RUR” by Karel Čapek decried the 
dehumanizing nature of labour routinization, painting a dys-
topian world in which humans are replaced by machines. He 
underlined the perils of modernization devoid of compassion 
and humility, a peril that he would later associate with the rise 
of authoritarianism. While the play has largely receded from 
memory, one word it coined has permeated most world lan-
guages – the robot. Derived from the Czech noun “robota”, 
designating “forced labour” or corvée, the robot replaces 
humans in all but their empathy, tenderness, mercy and love.
Recent years have witnessed an increased focus on the role 
of labour automation, whereby robots, computers or machines 
replace human workers. While there is an ongoing debate about 
the extent to which the rise of automation will displace human 
jobs (Arntz et al., 2016; Arntz et al., 2017; Autor and Dorn, 
2013; Frey and Osborne, 2017; Goos and Manning, 2007), the 
understanding that diverse occupations are at varying levels of 
risk of automation is pervasive in academic, as well as popular 
discourse. However, the question that remains unaddressed is 
how such risk translates into political behaviour.
This paper consequently proposes to address the electoral 
impact of automation in the economy. Our guiding hypothesis 
is that individuals threatened by automation are a potential 
reservoir of voters for European populist radical right parties 
(Camus and Lebourg, 2017; Mudde, 2007). These parties 
have been taking the side of workers threatened by globaliza-
tion and unfettered capitalism; they have also started to play 
on the threat of automation (Mulot, 2017). The potential “los-
ers of automation” could turn to them, as the “losers of glo-
balization” did before (Kriesi et al., 2008).
Electoral impact of automation
Our argument builds on earlier work that distinguishes 
between subjective and objective labour market threats 
(see, e.g., Kurer, 2018; Mayer, 2013, 2015; Rovny and 
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Rovny, 2017). These works demonstrate that it is not those 
objectively worse-off who lend the highest levels of sup-
port to the radical right. Rather, it is those who are above 
the threshold of precariousness or poverty, but perceive the 
risk of falling down into it.
In France, for instance, since the 1990s, blue-collar 
workers are the most inclined to vote for the Front National 
(Gougou and Mayer, 2012): 29% voted for Marine Le Pen 
in the 2012 presidential election, 10 points above her aver-
age score (Mayer, 2015). However, the proportion was 
higher among socially secure workers than among socially 
insecure ones: 35% compared to 20%.1 These workers who 
turned proportionately more to the radical right were on the 
“lower-middle” income and status scales or “little middle” 
(Cartier et al., 2016). Most importantly, they were also 
those who had something to lose and feared downward 
mobility (Mayer, 2015).
A similar result was found by Kriesi and Bornschier 
(2012). Using the post-industrial class schema of Oesch 
(2006, 2008), the authors found that the economically 
worse-off do not support the radical right more than aver-
age; instead, they abstain more than average. The typical 
radical right voter has “an intermediate level of education, 
belongs to the manual working class and is not disinter-
ested in politics and her/his reasons are cultural” (Kriesi 
and Bornschier, 2012: 26). Immigration is perceived as a 
threat to their identity. Using panel data on Germany, 
Switzerland and the UK, which runs from the 1990s to 
2014, Kurer (2018) shows that it is fear of social decline by 
job loss, rather than actual experience of it, which drives 
support for right-wing populist parties.
Our expectation is that labour automation represents 
another form of labour market risk. It, however, expands 
beyond the manual working class and affects “middling” 
white-collar jobs as well (Autor et al., 2003; Goos and 
Manning, 2007; Frey and Osborne, 2017). Individuals are 
likely to perceive the general risk of unemployment that 
they are exposed to. This risk is made up of a number of 
components, of which automation is one. One’s employ-
ment may be threatened by various mechanisms, such as: 
globalization (jobs going abroad), migration (replacement 
by cheaper workers), consumer preference change (demand 
disappearance), “rationalization” (reduction of workers to 
increase profit), automation (replacement of workers with 
machines), etc. In short, the threat of automation is but one 
particular component of general unemployment risk.2 We 
isolate this risk and assess its impact on political behaviour.
Why should those threatened by automation turn to the 
radical right? The radical right is well placed to respond to 
this form of risk due to its programmatic focus on the dis-
placement of native jobs by exogenous changes to the 
labour market, which include globalization, migration and 
automation. Radical right parties are currently not only the 
most electorally dynamic in Europe, but also the only 
non-mainstream parties to have put forward the issue of 
automation risk.3 Furthermore, and contrary to the radical 
left, which has often defended progress, including techno-
logical progress, radical right parties propose a narrative 
that is resolutely nostalgic of a mythic past (Gest et al., 
2017; Steenvoorden and Harteveld, 2018).
We propose a dual mechanism. First, on the demand 
side, individuals carrying out routine job tasks that lend 
themselves to automation are more likely to sense the threat 
of potential downward mobility and thus respond by sup-
porting the radical right.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Individuals more threatened by auto-
mation are more likely to vote for the radical right.
Second, we expect this sense of threat to be moderated by 
individuals’ current perceived economic situation. Threat is 
a more potent political driver when the danger is unknown. 
It is in this situation when individuals are still managing 
economically, but fear a loss of economic status, that they 
become more receptive to the radical right, whose appeals 
play heavily on the notion of threats and the “protection” 
against such threats. Building on the literature on social 
threats discussed above, as well as social mobility (Jackman 
and Volpert, 1996; Peugny, 2006), we expect individuals 
who are just economically coping to be most likely to 
respond to the threat of automation; they are most likely to 
fear a loss of status, which triggers greater likelihood of 
supporting the radical right (Rovny and Rovny, 2017). This 
is confirmed by a recent study by Frey et al. (2017), show-
ing that “automation anxiety” led to the support of Donald 
Trump in the 2016 presidential election, and by Dal Bó 
et al. (2018) on the appeal of the Swedish Democrats to 
“vulnerable insiders”. By contrast, individuals who per-
ceive themselves as already in economic difficulty are less 
likely to respond to the threat of automation by supporting 
the radical right.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Automation threat increases the 
propensity to vote for the radical right among those 
individuals who perceive their economic situation as 
middling.
We thus expect individuals who perceive themselves as 
standing just at the edge of the economic precipice to react 
most strongly to the threat of automation. They are thus 
significantly more likely to turn to the radical right. The 
response of these in the lower-middle positions is to turn 
against modernization presented by automation, and in the 
words of the Communist Manifesto, to “try to roll back the 
wheel of history” (Marx and Engels 2001: 23), which is 
offered by some radical right’s recent programmatic calls 
for a hark back to the “good old times” (Mondon, 2016: 
29).
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Data operationalization
To test our expectations, we use data from rounds 6, 7 and 
8 of the European Social Survey (ESS). ESS rounds 1 to 5 
were excluded from this study because a different occupa-
tional classification category is used in these rounds. As we 
do not have the ability to assess individual perception of 
automation risk, we rely on an “objective” measure of this 
risk provided by Arntz et al. (2016), which we assume is 
diffusely sensed by individuals. We then seek to assess the 
electoral impact of the narrower component of unemploy-
ment risk caused by the threat of automation.
Our dependent variable is voting behaviour in the previ-
ous national election. This variable measures five different 
voting behaviours: (a) vote for radical right; (b) vote for 
radical left; (c) vote for major left; (d) vote for major right 
parties; and (e) abstain. The variables are recoded from the 
variable “party voted for in last election”. This classifica-
tion broadly follows Rovny and Rovny’s (2017) approach 
(see Table 10 in the online appendix). To construct the cat-
egory “did not vote”, we used a variable asking whether 
respondents had voted in the previous national election.
Our key independent variable is the Arntz et al. (2016) 
index, which measures the risk of automation at the occu-
pational level. It is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 
1, with higher values denoting greater risk. The index is 
based on the two-digit level of the International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO) 2008 system. While 
ESS rounds 6, 7 and 8 used ISCO-08, rounds 1 to 5 use the 
older ISCO-88 system, which is why we exclude the latter. 
We prefer this index to the Frey and Osborne (2017) meas-
ure, since the latter is based only on US data, and assumes 
that all jobs in the same occupation group face the same 
risk of automation, whereas the Arntz et al. (2016) data 
concern European countries, and differentiate between risk 
of automation within occupations and across countries (for 
a discussion of the differences between the two measures, 
see online Appendix A11). Like the alternative Frey and 
Osborne (2017) index, both measure the likelihood of auto-
mation at the task level. This follows the recent task-based 
approach in labour economics literature, which defines 
tasks as “a unit of work activity that produces output” 
(Autor, 2013). A job is thus a composite of the different 
types of tasks a worker does (Owen and Johnston, 2017), 
and occupations are an aggregate of different jobs with 
potentially different task structures.
Arntz et al. (2016) use individual-level survey data from 
the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult 
Competencies (PIAAC), which measures a comprehensive 
list of self-reported tasks that people actually perform in 
their workplace (Arntz et al. 2016: 12), comparable across 
countries. Individuals are first assigned an automatability 
value primarily according to the set of tasks they perform, 
and secondarily according to gender, education, compe-
tences, income, firm-size and sector. Since PIAAC contains 
individual occupational categories at the ISCO two-digit 
level, the overall risk of automation for each occupational 
category reflects its share of workers with a high automa-
tion potential. Since this method measures risk of automa-
tion at the individual level, differences in task structures 
across countries are accounted for. They show that similar 
occupational categories in different countries face different 
risks of automation.
The ESS data does not, however, allow us to go beyond 
the level of occupational groups and account for variations 
of risks of automation within similar occupational groups 
due to differences in individual job task structures. This 
may be a limitation of this study since both Autor and 
Handel (2013) and  Arntz et al. (2016) have noted the pos-
sibility of variations in risks of automation within similar 
occupational groups.
The moderating variable proposed by H2 measures 
respondent feeling of economic security based on their pre-
sent household income (hincfel). Respondents place them-
selves into one of four categories: (a) living comfortably on 
present income; (b) coping on present income; (c) difficult 
on present income; and (d) very difficult on present income.
To further strengthen our claims and eliminate the pos-
sibility that our results could be driven by confounding fac-
tors, our statistical analyses control for age, gender, level of 
education, religiosity, union membership, if one belongs to 
an ethnic minority group and income. We also use country 
and year fixed effects in our model to account for country 
and time idiosyncrasies.
Our sample includes the following West European coun-
tries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the 
UK. We chose countries according to two criteria: (a) these 
countries are included in the Arntz et al. (2016) risk of auto-
mation index; and (b) these countries have radical right par-
ties with significant electoral success.
We employ multinomial logit regression models to test 
for the effects of the risk of automation on voting behav-
iour. Note that the voting for radical right parties is the 
specified base outcome in the regression model. To test if 
the effects of risk of automation on voting behaviour differ 
across levels of economic security, we include an interac-
tion term comprising risk of automation and feeling of eco-
nomic security based on present income. The models use 
design weights supplied by ESS and standard errors are 
clustered by countries.
Results and discussion
Turning to test H1, positing an effect of automation risk on 
the vote for the radical right, Figure 1 presents the relation-
ship between vote probability and risk of automation. A rise 
in risk of automation is positively associated with an 
increase in likelihood of voting for radical right parties. As 
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the risk of automation rises from 0 to 0.6, there is a 3.92 
percentage points associated increase in probability of vot-
ing for radical right parties. By contrast, an equal increase 
in risk of automation is associated with a 16 percentage 
points decrease in likelihood of voting for major right par-
ties. There is no significant effect on the vote for major and 
radical left parties.
H2 expects the risk of automation to impact support for 
radical right parties differently across levels of income 
security. Figure 2 shows that rise in risk of automation is 
significantly associated with an increase in the probability 
of voting for radical right parties for respondents who are 
living comfortably on present income, and particularly for 
those who are coping. Furthermore, all income groups 
demonstrate a reduced support for the major right as auto-
mation risk increases. Finally, those in very difficult income 
conditions are significantly less likely to vote for the major 
left, as the risk of automation increases. There is no effect 
on vote for the radical left.
Figure 3 further illustrates the vote probabilities over 
automation risk and across feeling of income  security. It 
shows that respondents who are coping and living comfort-
ably on present income are more likely to vote for radical 
right parties as risk of automation increases. This positive 
relationship is, however, slightly stronger for those who are 
coping on present income. By contrast, rising levels of risk 
of automation are associated with a fall in likelihood of 
supporting radical right parties among those who find it dif-
ficult and very difficult on present income, though these 
effects are not statistically significant.
Figure 3 also shows that there is a negative relationship 
between risk of automation and support for major right par-
ties for all levels of income security. Importantly, the risk of 
automation dramatically decreases the support for major 
left parties among those who find it very difficult to cope 
on their current income. These individuals are then most 
likely to abstain, or (a small portion of them) turn to the 
radical left, although the effect on radical left vote is not 
significant.
The results suggest two important findings. Automation 
interacts with individual economic situation and com-
pounds the effect on electoral behaviour. Those individuals 
coping on current income are generally significantly 
affected by increasing threat of automation, which drives 
them towards the radical right. This effect is, however, not 
observed for those who already find it difficult or very dif-
ficult to live on their current income – as automation risk 
increases, they are not significantly more likely to vote for 
the radical right.
These results are consistent with previous findings 
that individuals who are facing worse economic difficul-





Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of vote choice as automation changes with 95% confidence intervals.
Note: linear relationship between automation and vote choice. Based on Table 1 in the online appendix.
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Figure 2. Average marginal effects of risk of automation on vote choice by feeling of income security.
Vote radical right Vote major right
Vote major left
Vote radical left
Figure 3. Predicted probabilities of vote choice over risk of automation by feeling of income security.
Note: Confidence intervals were suppressed for readability.
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average (Mayer, 2015; Mayer et al., 2015; Rovny and 
Rovny, 2017). It is primarily those individuals who are 
doing just about fine, but who face threats – such as the 
threat of losing their work to machines or robots – who 
are more likely to turn to the radical right. Thus, while 
actual economic hardship leads voters to turn away from 
the polls, the fear of slipping into economic difficulty 
leads voters into the arms of the radical right.
Conclusion
This study examines the political consequences of automa-
tion risk. As automation is increasingly able to replace a 
greater number of human tasks, some workers face a greater 
risk of redundancy than others. We thus asked whether 
those facing high risk of automation are a potential reser-
voir of votes for radical right parties. Our findings suggest 
that risk of automation alone cannot fully explain support 
for radical right parties. Rather, it is the risk of automation 
among those who are just economically coping, but likely 
to be fearful of falling and losing what they have, which 
may motivate the vote for radical right parties (Rouban, 
2016a, 2016b).
One major limitation of this research pertains to differ-
ences in risk of automation within similar occupational 
groups. Due to limitations in the ESS data, we are only able 
to estimate individuals’ risk of automation at the level of 
occupational categories: individuals in the same occupa-
tional categories were assigned similar risks of automation. 
Since individuals in similar occupations may take on differ-
ent jobs comprising different task structures, future studies 
could estimate the risk of automation at the individual level 
and relate individual-level risk to voting behaviour.
This comparative study ultimately suggests that automa-
tion creates socio-structural conditions that may inform 
individual political orientations, and become a basis for 
new social grouping and political organization. Indeed, 
some political entrepreneurs – particularly from radical 
right parties – are starting to advance the issue. This is ech-
oed in recent comments by Marine Le Pen, the leader of the 
French radical right, in an interview in 2017 that “the robot-
ization of work engenders many legitimate fears, as it could 
replace many unqualified workers” (Mulot, 2017). The 
threat of robots, conjured up almost a century ago by a 
humanist writer, may have the potential of becoming strate-
gic electoral fodder for Europe’s radical right.
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Notes
1. According to scores on an indicator of social precariousness 
mixing social isolation and economic situation items, the 
“EPICES” score (see Mayer, 2014).
2. Indeed, if we compare our measure of automation risk with a 
measure of unemployment risk (Rehm, 2016), we conclude 
that these two measures correlate at r = 0.599, and automa-
tion risk explains 36% of the variance of unemployment risk.
3. See recent declarations by the leaders of the Freedom Party 
in the Netherlands (Champion and Van Der Schoot, 2017) 
and the Rassemblement National in France (Mulot, 2017).
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